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Abstract
Preventive care should be subsidized in traditional insurance contracts since policyholders
ignore the benefit of their prevention choice on the insurance premium (Ellis and Manning, 2007
JHE). We study participating policies as risk-sharing agreements among policyholders who
decide how much to invest in secondary prevention. We explore under which conditions these
policies allow partial or even full internalization of prevention benefits in an environment with
repeated interactions between policy holders. Welfare generated by the risk-sharing agreement
is increasing with the size of the pool, but at the same time the pool size must not be too large
for cooperation to sustain the internalization benefits.
Key words: secondary prevention, positive externality on the insurance premium, long
run enrollment, cooperation among policyholders.
1 Introduction
All developed countries are deeply engaged in improving prevention strategies and prevention poli-
cies to protect, promote and maintain health and to prevent disease, disability and premature death.
For example, according to the US Center for Disease Control and Prevention: “Called for by the
Aﬀordable Care Act, the National Prevention Strategy includes actions that public and private
partners can take to help Americans stay healthy and fit. It helps move the nation away from a
health care system focused on sickness and disease to one focused on wellness and prevention.”1 The
eﬀectiveness of disease prevention programs depends, among other things, on incentives provided
by the insurance system and on the resulting consumer choices.
∗E-mail address: francesca.barigozzi@unibo.it
†E-mail address: renaud.bourles@centrale-marseille.fr
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1US Center for Disease Control and Prevention, http://www.cdc.gov, consulted in March 2013.
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Some papers have studied optimal health insurance contracts when policyholders choose con-
sumption of both preventive care and treatment. Ellis and Manning (2007) investigate optimal
coverage for primary prevention, showing that a positive copayment for preventive care is desir-
able since traditional cost-sharing contracts ignore the beneficial impact of preventive care on the
insurance premium. In other words, since the insurance premium is fixed and is not aﬀected by
the policyholders’ prevention choices, without a positive coverage consumers would under-invest
in prevention. In a similar way, when secondary prevention and treatment are substitute inputs
in the health recovery function, Barigozzi (2004) shows that a positive copayment for secondary
prevention is optimal.
The aim of this paper is to analyze alternative contracts encouraging prevention: participating
policies. As we will show, participating policies can lead to full internalization of the positive eﬀect
that prevention has on the insurance premium. This result is basically driven by two main facts:
(i) participating policies induce more responsible (or less myopic) behaviors since policyholders
bear the aggregate health risk; (ii) firms oﬀering participating policies generally promote long run
relationships with their policyholders, and long run enrollment proves to be eﬀective in increasing
preventive eﬀorts.
When purchasing participating policies2, consumers jointly hold the residual claims of the pool.
In practice, policyholders become the members of a risk-sharing agreement and contribute whatever
amount is needed yearly to meet the health expenditures covered by the policy (Doherty and Dionne
1993, Picard 2009). Risk-sharing is usually in the form of an initial contribution followed by later
“calls”, if required, to maintain the common fund. More importantly, the premium of a participating
policy is random (since it depends on how many and how important negative health shocks are
finally realized) and, as a consequence, policyholders in risk arrangements always face aggregate
risk.
Since participating policies have been, and currently are, mainly oﬀered by mutual insurance
firms, many studies in the literature use the terms ‘mutual’ and ‘participating policies’ interchange-
ably (see Smith and Stutzer, 1995). We investigate participating policies, no matter what type of
firm is oﬀering them, but we will frequently refer to empirical evidence on mutuals insurers and to
mutuals’ corporate culture and mission to support our arguments and results.
Our paper oﬀers a welfare analysis of participating policies in health insurance when prevention
matters. In particular, we investigate secondary prevention which refers to all measures allowing
early detection of disease such as diagnostic screening, medical examinations and checkups.3 In
the past decade, the policy debate on secondary prevention has become particularly active. For
example in May 2005 the 58th World Health Assembly of the World Health Organization approved
a resolution calling on Member States to intensify compliance with cancer prevention by encour-
aging screening tests such as mammograms, pap smears and colonoscopy. The design of incentive
compatible insurance policies is obviously a crucial instrument that policy-maker can use to increase
compliance with preventive care.
We study participating policies as risk-sharing agreements among identical policyholders who
decide how much to invest in secondary prevention. In particular, secondary prevention is modeled
as a costly action that, when illness occurs, reduces health care expenditures necessary to recover.
2Participating policies are available for all types of insurance coverage: health, medical malpractice, life, car, fire,
agriculture, maritime insurance, etc.
3According to the health economics literature, primary prevention reduces the probability of illness, whereas
secondary prevention reduces vulnerability to illness. In other words, primary prevention, such as physical exercise
and diets, concerns the avoidance of undesirable outcomes. Secondary prevention measures instead, by detecting an
illness when it is still asymptomatic, reduce its incidence and facilitate patient recovery (see Kenkel 2000).
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In the model, policyholders can choose the level of prevention either non-cooperatively or co-
operatively. Non-cooperative choice allows for partial internalization of the eﬀect of prevention
on the insurance premium, whereas cooperation allows for full internalization and thus implies an
eﬃciency gain. We find that partial coverage is optimal under the non-cooperative strategy while
full coverage is optimal whenever policyholders cooperate. Moreover, the cooperative outcome al-
ways dominates the non-cooperative equilibrium in terms of policyholders’ welfare and replicates
the first-best allocation as pool size rises to infinity.
However, participating policies do not always deliver cooperation. We identify conditions under
which cooperation can be sustained as an equilibrium within a repeated interaction game. Since
policyholders’ incentives to free ride are always higher in a large pool, the equilibrium with coop-
eration, if it exists, is enforceable only when the pool size is not too high. When the pool size is
so large that the cooperative equilibrium is not enforceable, then the non-cooperative equilibrium
necessarily arises. This depicts a schedule for policyholders’ welfare in equilibrium that is piecewise
increasing in the pool size, but discontinuous (with a downward jump when cooperation turns out
to be no longer enforceable, see Figure 3). We conclude that, in risk sharing arrangements, pol-
icyholders may fully internalize the benefit of their prevention choice on the insurance premium.
However a trade-oﬀ arises with respect to the number of policyholders purchasing the policy. On
the one hand, the benefit from risk-sharing is increasing in the size of the pool; on the other hand
eﬃciency (that is full internalization of the impact of prevention) is only compatible with a pool
size that is not too large.
Interestingly, some evidence confirms the relatively small dimension of mutual companies, espe-
cially in Europe. For example, according to the International Cooperative and Mutual Federation
(ICMIF)4, the total market share of the 2,900 mutual firms active in 75 countries at the end of 2010
was just 26%. More detailed evidence can be found in France and Italy. Caire (2009) reports that,
in 2007 in France, the 808 existing mutuals accounted for 58% of the health insurance market, the
9 active stock (i.e. standard) insurers owned 23% of the market while the remaining 19% was the
share of “institutions de prévoyance” (non-profit organizations that oﬀer collective insurance con-
tracts for firms).5 Likewise in Italy, health mutual firms are definitely characterized by small size:
about 1,500 “Società di mutuo soccorso” (mutual benefit societies) were active in 2010, they had
less than one million members and represented around 12% of the Italian market in complementary
health insurance (see Lippi Bruni et al. 2012).
Our results are also in line with the common view that participating policies in small pools allow
better coordination of policyholders’ behaviors and with both empirical and theoretical literature
on organizational form in insurance and risk-sharing (see for example Ligon and Thistle, 2005;
Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Genicot and Ray, 2003 or Bramoullé and Kranton, 2007).
Our model shows that cooperation can be obtained when policyholders play a repeated game
with the other members of the risk-sharing agreement. Thus, cooperation is the outcome of a long
run enrollment. Importantly, while no incentives to a long run interaction (that makes prevention
profitable for the insurer) are oﬀered to policyholders in standard health policies, firms oﬀering
participating policies seem to encourage long run enrollment and cooperative behaviors in diﬀerent
ways.
In this perspective, Goeﬀard (2000) shows that in France premiums of mutual insurers increase
4See the Global Mutual Market Share report 2010, available at http://www.icmif.org/mms2010.
5 Similarly, Kerleau (2009) shows that the market for participating policies is characterized by low concentration
in France, as the 5 biggest mutuals in 2005 represented only 20% of the market share and the 30 biggest ones only
44%.
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less with age than those of stock insurers. Broek et al. (2012) compare the diﬀerent national
legal regimes for mutuals in Europe. On the one hand mutual companies are built on solidarity and
mutual support principles irrespectively of the risk they cover; on the other hand, mutuals providing
health coverage seem naturally committed to prevention, given their interest in long-term contracts.
For instance, the French “Code de la mutualité” regulates all aspects of the organization of mutuals,
carrying out solidarity, mutual aid-based work and emphasizing a culture of healthy life-style and
preventive behaviors.6
More generally, firms oﬀering participating policies seem to provide eﬀective incentives to their
policyholders and are traditionally associated with lower costs.7 Indeed, the mutual/cooperative
sector performed relatively better during the recession: at a world level the mutual/cooperative
market share increased by 2.7% from 2007 and it increased by 5.2% in Europe. In this respect, it is
argued that the better-than-market performance of mutuals may have been boosted by higher levels
of customer trust and customer satisfaction associated with the participating form of the policy,
which may easily translate into higher levels of cooperative behaviors.
Our paper is also related to the insurance literature studying the eﬃciency of risk-sharing
arrangements. The latter have been diﬀusely analyzed, for example, in settings with asymmetric
information (see, among others, Mayers and Smith 1986 and Smith and Stutzer 1990). In this
literature, the contribution most closely related to our paper is Lee and Ligon (2001). They study
optimal risk-sharing contracts when policyholders use a non-cooperative strategy in the choice
of a self-protection measure, while we analyze self-insurance (secondary prevention) focusing on
cooperative behaviors as possible alternatives to non-cooperative ones.
The structure of the article is described below. Section 2 illustrates the model set-up. Then
two benchmark cases are described: the first-best in Subsections 2.1 and, the second-best policy
with fixed premium in Subsection 2.2. Section 3 introduces participating policies. Sections 4 and 5
study the non-cooperative equilibrium and the cooperative outcome in the risk-sharing agreement,
respectively. The relationship between pool size and eﬃciency is discussed in Section 6. Section 7
shows how cooperation can be enforced. Section 8 discusses some policy issues. Concluding remarks
follow in the last section.
2 The model
The economy is composed of  identical individuals with utility from money represented by a strictly
increasing and concave von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function () which is diﬀerentiable at
least twice. Individuals have initial wealth  and face the probability  of a monetary loss of size
() with independently and identically distributed risks.
The loss () is a function of individuals’ action  such that 0()  0. From Ehrlich and Becker
(1972), a consumer’s action decreasing the amount of a possible loss is a self-insurance measure.
By interpreting () as the monetary equivalent of a negative health shock, the action  refers to
secondary prevention or early detection of disease. Secondary prevention is exerted before the risk is
realized. As specified in the introduction, medical examinations, check-ups and diagnostic screening
help to reduce the severity of illness, and as such are to be considered secondary prevention measures.
In particular, secondary prevention decreases the amount of health care necessary to recover from
the negative health shock.
6See also our discussion in Section 8.
7 See Mayers and Smith (1986), Cummins and Zi (1998) and Cummins et al. (1999), (2004) for studies documenting
the better performance of mutuals in the life insurance market.
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The disutility from secondary prevention () with  0() ≥ 0 and  00()  0 is due to time-
consuming, invasive and sometimes unpleasant diagnostic procedures (e.g. colonoscopy.), and is
assumed to be additively separable from the utility derived from money.8 To assure an internal
solution for prevention choice we also impose  0(0) = 0.
A policy (partially) reimburses the losses suﬀered by policyholders in exchange for an insurance
premium. Although for the sake of tractability the function () is deterministic,9 the insurer
cannot perfectly control secondary prevention (so that moral hazard will be an issue) because it
oﬀers cost-sharing or linear contracts. More precisely, policyholders obtain a partial reimbursement
of their health care expenditure according to the fraction  0 ≤  ≤ 1 so that the contract pays
() in case of illness. Cost-sharing contracts are also the prevailing type of contract in health
insurance.
Prevention reduces the amount of treatment necessary to recover so that health expenditure
(and thus reimbursement paid by the insurer) decreases. We will show that, with participating
policies, policyholders might fully internalize the benefit of their prevention choice on the premium.
Before doing so, in the next two sub-sections we analyze two benchmark cases, useful for further
comparisons: the first-best contract and the second-best one. The latter, characterized by a fixed
premium, represents a non-participating policy contract in outline.
2.1 The first-best contract
We consider here optimal coverage for a representative consumer in a perfect information environ-
ment. The first-best contract solves the following program:
max  =  ( − ()− () + ()) + (1− ) ( − ())− () (1)
where policyholders receive () in the event of illness and the fair premium is ().
Let’s denote net consumption in the two states of nature as  when loss occurs and 0 with
no loss, respectively. The optimal value of the cost-sharing parameter  is full coverage ¡ = 1¢,
so that net consumption in the two possible states of the world is the same:  = 0 =  =
 − (). Consequently, the optimal choice of prevention is:
 :  0( − ()) (−0()) =  0() (2)
The left-hand side of (2) shows the marginal benefit while the right-hand side shows the marginal
cost of prevention. Note that, in the first-best contract, policyholders perfectly internalize the
beneficial eﬀect of prevention on the premium (see the term  0( − ())). In particular, they
take into account that a higher level of self-insurance, by decreasing the premium, has a positive
impact on marginal utility in both the possible states of nature. Marginal benefit is increasing in 
and in −0(), i.e. the eﬃciency of the prevention technology. Policyholders’ welfare is maximized
and corresponds to:
 =  ¡ − ()¢− () (3)
8Secondary prevention could also imply a monetary cost to be incorporated in the loss function () This would
not aﬀect our results, provided that the property 0()  0 is maintained or that the advantage of prevention more
than compensates its cost.
9 In the case of participating policies, the premium depends on the number of policyholders suﬀering the loss, which
is unknown ex-ante, so that expected utility must be calculated with a complex binomial function (see expressions
8 and 11 below). Hence, assuming a stochastic relationship between  and  would dramatically complicate the
analysis without adding relevant insights.
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2.2 The second-best contract with fixed premium
As mentioned above, we interpret the second-best contract as a non-participating policy with fixed
premium. The timing of actions is the following: first, the insurer proposes the contract; second,
the consumers accept the contract and choose the prevention level; finally the risk is realized. Pol-
icyholders receive () in the event of illness and the premium is  = (). A fair premium is
coherent both with the case of a benevolent monopolistic health insurer (i.e. a public/social insur-
ance) and with the case of a large number of insurers in a competitive market. The representative
policyholder’s expected utility is:
 =  [ − ()−  + ()] + (1− ) ( −  )− () (4)
The optimal prevention level is calculated given the contract ( ). The policyholder’s optimal
choice thus verifies:
∗() : −(1− )0() 0() =  0() (5)
Obviously, if  = 1 then no prevention is the outcome so that the insurer will never oﬀer full
insurance and 6=0 By comparing (2) and (5) we observe that in the latter FOC policyholders
do not definitively internalize the positive impact that prevention has on the premium, as precisely
emphasized by Ellis and Manning (2007). In the l.h.s. of (5) only the beneficial eﬀect of prevention
on the potential illness (when net consumption is ) is taken into account. We will show that
the FOC is diﬀerent in the case of a participating policy since the policyholders (at least partially)
internalize the positive impact of prevention on the premium.
To derive the optimal second-best contract we proceed backward: the insurance firm maximizes
the policyholder’s utility (4) subject to the resources constraint ( = ()) and the policyholder’s
incentive constraint (5). Solving this program, the optimal level of coverage  is found to be lower
than 1 (partial coverage), which means that the usual trade-oﬀ between risk-sharing and incentives
arises.
3 Participating policies
We are going to define participating policies in the case of cooperative and non-cooperative choice of
prevention among policyholders. Then we will compare outcomes under the two diﬀerent strategies
both for a finite pool size and when the number of policyholders goes to infinity. Those comparisons
are necessary in order to set up the analysis of cooperation among members of the risk-sharing
arrangement.
Suppose now that the insurer oﬀers a participating policy to the  identical individuals. Again
 is the percentage of the loss reimbursed to each policyholder and () is the indemnity received
in the event of illness. Let’s call  the number of policyholders that experience the negative health
shock out of the  identical individuals in the pool:  ∈ {0  }. The peculiarity of the par-
ticipating policy is that the aggregate indemnity reimbursed to the policyholders, and hence the
required individual premium, are not fixed; both depend on the realization of . This implies that
the individual premium is random.
Definition 1 The participating policy is such that the aggregate amount of indemnities to be paid
to policyholders belonging to the pool (()) is equally shared among the  members of the pool.
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Thus, the individual premium is: ()
10 .
The overall amount of premiums collected by the pool exactly covers the aggregate indemnities
paid to the  individuals experiencing the negative health shock. This is a standard property of
participating policies: profits are always zero ex-post11 .
The timing of actions is the following:
1. the coverage level, , is chosen by the pool.
2. Each policyholder chooses his prevention level either non-cooperatively or cooperatively.
3. The risk (and thus the number  of policyholders submitting a claim) is realized.
Note that, in the second stage, policyholders’ choice of prevention can be either cooperative or
non-cooperative.
3.1 Non-cooperative choice of prevention
We now investigate the case where prevention is chosen non-cooperatively. The representative
policyholder only internalizes the eﬀect of his own prevention on the random premium in the
event he experiences the loss. In other words, the policyholder neglects the “social” benefit of
prevention on the aggregate loss in both states of nature. Remember that  is the total number
of policyholders experiencing the loss in the pool. Here we take into account the view of the
representative policyholder and we define  as the number of individuals that experience the loss
once we exclude the representative consumer from the pool. This allows us to write the expected
utility of the representative policyholder. If the policyholder  experiences the illness himself, then
 =  + 1 whereas if he does not,  = . Thus, for a given realization of :
 [;  − | ] = 
³
 −  (() + (−))− () + ()
´
(6)
+(1− )
µ
 −  (−)
¶
− ()
where  is the prevention level exerted by  and − is the level exerted by the other  − 1
policyholders in the pool.
It is worth noting that policyholder  behaves as if the impact of his own prevention on the
premium were diﬀerent in the two states of nature. In particular, he perceives that his prevention
level aﬀects the insurance premium only when he suﬀers the negative health shock, such that the
premium writes  (() + (−)) in this case, whereas he perceives that his premium does not
depend on his prevention level when he is healthy, such that the premium writes  (−) when
no loss occurs.
To summarize, in the non-cooperative case, each policyholder internalizes part of the eﬀect of
his own prevention on the premium, i.e. (), and only in the event of illness.
10Note that such an “equal sharing rule” is not the optimal incentive-compatible rule. The optimal rule would be
obtained by maximizing the expected utility of a representative policyholder under the incentive constraint, and a
resource constraint that would have to be fulfilled in every state of nature (and not only in expectation). Still, the
equal sharing rule defined above seems to better describe actual participating policies, in particular in the health
insurance market.
11 In the case of participating policies, if at the end of the period the aggregate indemnities to be reimbursed by
the insurer are greater than the premiums collected, policyholders are asked to pay an additional premium. If, on the
other hand, the aggregate indemnities to be reimbursed are lower than the premiums collected, either policyholders
receive money back or the insurer uses “profits” to increase its contingency reserves and funds.
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3.2 Cooperative choice of prevention
We innovate with respect to the existing literature on risk-sharing agreements by allowing policy-
holders to choose the prevention action cooperatively, thus making it possible to fully internalize
the “social” benefit of the policyholders’ prevention choice on the aggregate health expenditures.
Definition 2 Cooperation is the situation where all policyholders agree on a common prevention
level that maximizes the expected welfare of a representative policyholder.
Therefore, we consider here the representative policyholder’s problem as his choice of the co-
operative prevention level when all the other policyholders cooperate as well. The representative
policyholder’s expected utility, given that  members out of the others (−1) experience the illness,
is now:
 [;  | ] = 
µ
 − ()− ( + 1)() + ()
¶
+ (1− )
µ
 − ()
¶
−() (7)
where  is the prevention level chosen by all cooperating consumers in the pool. Cooperation allows
policyholders to fully internalize the positive externality exerted by their prevention choice on the
insurance premium. Thus, we expect a higher level of prevention under cooperation than in the
case of non-cooperation.
In the following sections, we will first analyze the non-cooperative game, and then we will derive
the policyholders’ payoﬀ under cooperation.
4 Non-cooperative equilibrium
When policyholders do not cooperate, the representative individual ’s expected utility, given that
 other members of the pool have experienced the illness, is expressed in (6) above. Considering
all possible realizations of  :
 (;  −) =
−1X
=0
(;− 1; ) [;  − | ]  (8)
where (; − 1; ) is the binomial probability of  negative health shocks with  − 1 individuals
characterized by probability of illness .
Solving backward, in the second step the representative policyholder chooses his own preven-
tion level. The optimal choice maximizes the expected utility taking as given the prevention
level chosen by other policyholders − and the coverage , that is ∗ (  −) = argmax (;  −) In particular:
∗ (  −) :
−1X
=0
(;− 1; ){ 0 £ ¤ (−(1− )0()− 0())} = 0() (9)
where, as previously explained, net consumption in the case of illness is = −  (() + (−))
−() +().
Interestingly, from (9) and contrary to (5), we see that with a participating policy, prevention
would be positive even in the case of full coverage ( = 1), since the marginal benefit of prevention
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is always greater than zero. The reason is that here policyholders internalize part of the beneficial
impact of prevention on the premium through the term () appearing on the left-hand side of
equation (9). However, we will see below that full coverage is never optimal when policyholders do
not cooperate, just as in the case of the second-best non-participating policy analyzed in Subsection
2.2.
With identical agents, the equilibrium is symmetric and  = − =  so that:
∗( ) :
−1X
=0
(;− 1; ){ 0 £ ¤ (−0()(1−  +  ))} = 0() (10)
where  =  − (+1) ()− (1− )()
We can now consider the first step of the game: since the coverage is chosen collectively and
is unique in the pool, ∗ is the solution of the program where the expected utility of the rep-
resentative policyholder is maximized with respect to coverage  under the incentive compatibility
constraint (10).
Lemma 1 When policyholders act non-cooperatively in the second stage, the participating policy is
characterized by partial coverage
¡∗  1¢.
Proof. See the Appendix 10.1.
Similarly to the second-best contract considered in Subsection 2.2, when they choose preven-
tion non-cooperatively, policyholders receive here a partial reimbursement. This result holds even
though, given the participating policy and the random premium, policyholders face a higher risk
than in the second-best. For this reason we expect that the optimal (partial) coverage within the
participating policy will be higher than the optimal (partial) coverage in second-best.12
5 The cooperative outcome
Under cooperation, the representative policyholder ’s expected utility, given that  individuals
other than  have experienced the loss, is expressed in (7) above. Considering all possible values of
, expected utility becomes:
(; ) =
−1X
=0
(;− 1; ) [;  | ]  (11)
In the second step of the game, the optimal choice of prevention, given the risk-sharing rule and
12Lee and Ligon (2001) analyze the non-cooperative solution in a mutual arrangement when a self-protection
measure is available to policyholders (i.e. in the case of an action that decreases the loss probability). Using
“Cournot conjectures” they show that, despite the presence of ex-ante moral hazard, full coverage is optimal. Our
result diﬀers from theirs since we solve the problem using the concept of Nash equilibrium. This implies that, when
choosing the reimbursement level  in the first step, policyholders anticipate the eﬀect of such a coverage on the
prevention choice of other members of the pool. Thus, the second term in expression (19) of the proof, in Appendix
10.1, is diﬀerent from zero in our model, whereas the corresponding term is zero in Lee and Ligon (2001).
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the coverage , is ∗( ) = argmax (; ) In particular:
∗( ) :
−1X
=0
(;− 1; )
n
( 0 £ ¤ (−0() + (−(+1)) 0()) (12)
+(1− ) 0 £0 ¤ ³−0() ´o =  0()
where net consumption can be written as:  = − (+1) () −() + () and 0 = −
 ()
We can now consider the first step of the game: under cooperation the optimal coverage ∗
solves the program where expected utility (; ) is maximized with respect to the coverage
 under the incentive compatibility constraint (12).
Corollary 1 When policyholders act cooperatively in the second stage, the participating policy im-
plies full coverage
¡∗ = 1¢.
Proof. See Appendix 10.2.
Note that we obtained partial coverage under the non-cooperative strategy but full coverage in
the case of cooperation. Intuitively, under cooperation, policyholders fully internalize the impact
their action has on the premium and thus choose a suﬃciently high level of prevention, even when
the coverage is 1. In the non-cooperative case, on the other hand, partial internalization implies
that policyholders need higher incentives, in the form of partial coverage, to choose a suﬃciently
high level of secondary prevention13.
From (12), one can easily check that the optimal action is positive even with full coverage. In
particular, when ∗ = 1, the optimal prevention becomes:
∗( 1) :
−1X
=0
(;− 1; )
n
−
¡
1

¢0() 0µ − +1 ()
¶
− £ 0()¤0() o = 0() (13)
where  £ 0()¤ =  0 ¡ ¢+ (1− ) 0 ¡0 ¢ 
Concerning the implicit solutions for the policyholders’ optimal prevention level, i.e. equations
(5), (10) and (13), we note that the term − £ 0()¤0()   0 only appears in the left-hand
side of (13), i.e. in the marginal benefit of prevention under cooperation. Such a term represents
the whole positive impact that the costly prevention action has on the random premium (and, thus,
on marginal utility of net consumption) in both states of the world. In other words and once again,
under cooperation the positive impact of prevention on the premium is fully taken into account by
policyholders.
Note that, despite full coverage, the representative policyholder faces some risks because his
expected utility depends on his own realization of the illness. Indeed the latter changes the total
number of health expenditures  given that  =  + 1 if he gets the illness and  =  if he is
healthy.
13From an analytical point of view, full coverage is optimal since the Envelope Theorem can be fully applied when
deriving the optimal coverage  under cooperation. See, in particular, the diﬀerence between equation (19) and (20)
in Appendix 10.1 and 10.2 respectively.
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6 Pool size and participating policies
We now compare the non-cooperative equilibrium and the cooperative outcome considering how
policyholders’ payoﬀ changes with pool size. In particular we show that, as we expected, policy-
holders are better oﬀ under cooperation than in the non-cooperative equilibrium and that, under
cooperation, their welfare is increasing in the pool size. Moreover, as the pool size goes to infinity,
we show that the non-cooperative equilibrium converges to the second-best non-participating policy,
whereas the cooperative outcome converges to the first-best allocation.
First of all consider that, when  = 1 the non-cooperative payoﬀ and the cooperative outcome
are obviously identical and depict a situation where the representative consumer is not insured:
1 =  ( − ()) + (1− ) ()− ()
The FOC with respect to prevention in this case is:
∗1 : − 0 ( − ())0() = 0()
By definition, the optimal prevention level under cooperation satisfies ∗ = argmax(;  ),
whereas in the non-cooperative case prevention verifies ∗ = argmax (;  ∗− ) In
other words: the cooperative outcome corresponds to a situation where agents optimize on both their
own prevention level and on the prevention choices of others (provided they are the same) whereas
in the non-cooperative equilibrium, prevention levels are constrained to be Nash-equilibrium pre-
vention choices such that ∗ = ∗− = ∗ . Since the non-cooperative equilibrium can always
be achieved cooperatively, we can state the following:
Remark 1 Given a risk-sharing agreement with pool size strictly larger than 1, the cooperative
outcome always dominates the non-cooperative equilibrium.
Now let’s consider how the outcome under cooperation changes with the pool size:
Lemma 2 Under cooperation policyholders’ expected utility is monotonically increasing with the
size of the pool.
Proof. See the Appendix 10.3.
Note that the previous result is an extension of Borch’s rule (1962) to the case where consumers
choose a self-insurance measure: the benefit of risk-sharing increases with the size of the pool.
Unfortunately, the proof of Lemma 2 cannot be easily extended to the non-cooperative case
because of the partial coverage characterizing the non-cooperative equilibrium. Since the benefit of
risk-sharing increases with the size of the pool in the non-cooperative equilibrium as well, we expect
the policyholders’ welfare to be increasing with the size of the pool also in the non-cooperative case.
Our intuition is confirmed by the following simulations (see also Figure 1 below).
Simulations The reported results refer to CARA utility function14:
( ) = −
−

14Very similar results were obtained for other utility functions and are available from the authors on request.
11
where  represents the degree of constant absolute risk-aversion and was assigned the value of 05.
Wealth  is 10 and the probability of illness  is 03. The cost of prevention is expressed by the
function () = 2, while the loss caused by health expenditures is () = 1− .
Policyholders’ expected utility in the case of cooperation and in the case of non-cooperation
are shown in Figure 1 below. First, as stated in Lemma 2, expected utility under cooperation is
monotonically increasing in the size of the pool. Second, in line with Remark 1, the cooperative
payoﬀ dominates the non-cooperative equilibrium for every possible value of the pool size. Finally,
as we expected, the non-cooperative payoﬀ is (monotonically) increasing in the size of the pool.
Insert figure 1 about here
6.1 Asymptotic results
Remember that  is the total number of individuals in the pool experiencing the negative health
shock. By the law of large numbers, as the number of policyholders tends towards infinity, the
share of them suﬀering the illness ¡ ¢ tends towards the probability of illness . This implies
that, in a very large pool, the random premium with the participating policy () tends to the
fixed premium () as in non-participating contracts (see Subsection 2.2 above), thus making
the uncertainty on the premium disappear. This occurs both under the non-cooperative and under
the cooperative strategy. Further, under cooperation, since full coverage is oﬀered to policyholders,
the fixed premium becomes ()
Let’s consider the first-order condition for the prevention action in the non-cooperative equi-
librium (10). As  → ∞ the term  → 0 while the term +1 =  →  Thus, the first-order
condition becomes:
∗∞ :  0 ( − (1−  + )()) (−0()(1− )) =  0()
which is equivalent to (5). We can conclude that, as →∞ the policyholders’ payoﬀ in the non-
cooperative equilibrium is exactly the same as with the second-best contract with a fixed premium.
Let’s now consider the optimal cooperative prevention action. As →∞ the first-order condi-
tion (13) becomes:
∗∞ :  0 ( − ()) (−0()) =  0() (14)
By comparing (2) and (14) we can easily verify that:
∗∞ ≡ 
Thus, the consumers’ payoﬀ under cooperation when →∞ replicates the first-best (3).
All the previous reasoning is stated in the following Lemma:
Lemma 3 When the number of policyholders goes to infinity, a participating policy without coop-
eration tends to the second-best non-participating contract, while a participating policy in the case
of cooperation converges to the first-best allocation.
In what follows we verify that, contrary to the non-cooperative outcome, the cooperative choice
of prevention is never an equilibrium in a one-shot game among policyholders because of the incen-
tives to free-ride. We then study conditions such that cooperation can be sustained as equilibrium
in a repeated game where policyholders interact an indefinite number of times.
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7 Cooperation as an equilibrium
It can easily be shown that cooperation in the second stage of the game considered in Subsection 3.2
can never be an equilibrium in a static framework. Suppose that the optimal choice of  has already
been taken by the pool in the previous stage (∗ = 1). Under full coverage, the policyholder’s best
response  , when all the other policyholders choose the cooperative strategy ∗ , is obtained as
follows:
max

 =
−1X
=0
(;− 1; )
n

∙
 − 1
¡( ) + (∗)¢¸ (15)
+ (1− )
∙
 − (
∗)
¸o
− ( )
Thus, the best response to the cooperative level of prevention ∗ is:
 ( 1) : (16)
−1X
=0
(;− 1; )© 0 £− 1 ¡( ) + (∗)¢¤ ¡− 10( )¢ª = 0( )
which is lower than the cooperative prevention, i.e.:
  ∗
The above result is not surprising: the costly prevention action performed by each policyholder
in the pool exerts a positive externality on the random premium and the policyholder prefers to
free ride on it. The most advantageous situation for a member of the pool is when all the other
policyholders internalize the social benefit of prevention on the random premium, while he just
internalizes the impact of his action on his own health expenditures in the event of illness. As
is always the case for positive externalities, the market (or non-cooperative) solution implies that
individuals’ choices of prevention are ineﬃciently low. In our context this implies that cooperation
cannot be sustained as an equilibrium in the one-shot interaction among policyholders.
In the following we will consider how the cooperative solution can be implemented. The issue
is very similar to the cartel enforcement problem faced by firms in oligopolistic markets.
We investigate a case where the members of the pool interact for an uncertain number of periods.
We will see that cooperation can be sustained as equilibrium if the members of the pool implement
a punishment when they observe an insurance claim which is higher than expected. In fact, a high
loss means that someone deviated from the cooperative choice by exerting a low level of prevention
(see the last part of this section about extending the game to a stochastic loss function). As a
consequence, to punish the deviator, the other policyholders exert the non-cooperative prevention
level in all the subsequent periods.
In particular, we adapt the Folk Theorem to our environment by interpreting the time horizon
as uncertain. Note that deviation by one policyholder is detected by the other members of the pool
only if the deviator experiences the illness. Thus, we are in a stochastic environment regarding
deviation observability.
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Let’s call  the “probability-adjusted” discount factor.15 We apply the Grim trigger strategy in
our context: in the first period  = 0 the policyholder chooses the cooperative prevention level ∗ 
In  ≥ 1 the policyholder exerts ∗ if in each previous period any losses that have occurred are of
size  ¡∗¢, otherwise he exerts  = ∗ forever.
The Grim trigger strategy we have just described better fits a non-competitive environment,
that is a situation where policyholders have no choice but to stay in the pool, as in the case of a
monopolistic insurer.16 We refer the reader to the conclusion of the paper for a discussion on how
to make the punishment more coherent with a competitive health insurance market.
For expositional reasons, let’s call (∗  ∗  ) the policyholder’s payoﬀ when he cooperates
and (  ∗  ) his payoﬀ when he deviates (see expression (15)). In the period after deviation,
the policyholder will be detected only if the illness is realized, that is with probability . In that
case, all the other members of the pool will react by choosing the non-cooperative prevention level
∗ .
Let’s call (∗  ∗  ) the payoﬀ the deviator obtains when he is detected. The strategy
 = ∗ for the deviator is just the subgame perfect Grim trigger strategy in our game.
With probability (1− ) the deviation is not detected and the policyholder obtains the payoﬀ
(  ∗  ) in the period after the deviation as well.17 The previous reasoning is repeated in
the subsequent periods. After a deviation the policyholder’s payoﬀ can be written as follows:
(  ∗  ) + 
µ
1
1− (
∗  ∗  )
¶
+
(1− )
½
(  ∗  ) +  11− (
∗  ∗  )+
(1− )
∙
(  ∗  ) +  11− (
∗  ∗  ) + (1− )[]
¸¾
Thus, the discounted payoﬀ in the case of deviation is:

1− 
∞X
=0
( (1− ))(∗  ∗  ) +
∞X
=0
( (1− ))(  ∗  )
or:
1
1−  (1− )
∙
(  ∗  ) + 1− (
∗  ∗  )
¸
;
15 It is the product of the discount factor and the belief policyholders have regarding the probability that they will
continue to interact from period to period.
16Note that, when no other insurers are active in the market, exclusion of the deviator from the pool would be a
possible alternative punishment strategy. In that case the deviator, once detected, would obtain forever his expected
utility when not insured: 1 =  ( − ()) + (1− ) () − (). However, contrary to the non-cooperative
equilibrium, exclusion of the deviator cannot be interpreted as an equilibrium of the one-shot game and, for this
reason, we do not propose it as a punishment strategy.
17The strategy  =  for the deviator results from the Bellman principle:
0 = max

( ∗  ) +  [ + (1− )0]

= ( ∗  ) +  [ + (1− )0]
where 0 is the present value of the policyholder’s best reply when his deviation is not detected, whereas  is the
present value of the policyholder’s best response when his deviation is detected.
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whereas if the policyholder cooperates forever, the discounted payoﬀ he obtains is:
∞X
=0
(∗  ∗  ) = 1
1− (
∗  ∗  )
From the previous reasoning, cooperation can be sustained as an equilibrium if the discounted
payoﬀ from cooperation dominates the discounted payoﬀ from deviation, or when the inequality
below holds:
1
1− (
∗  ∗  ) ≥ 1
1−  (1− )
∙
(  ∗  ) + 1− (
∗  ∗  )
¸
(17)
From inequality (17) we can state the following:
Proposition 1 The cooperative level of secondary prevention can be sustained as an equilibrium in
a repeated game with uncertain horizon. When the cooperative equilibrium exists, it can be sustained
only if the number of policyholders is not too high.
Proof. See the Appendix 10.4.
The previous proposition states that only a pool size which is not too large is compatible with
the cooperative equilibrium. In fact, incentives to free ride are higher in a large pool: when  is
high, (i) by deviating from the cooperative prevention level the policyholder significantly decreases
the cost of prevention, whereas deviation has almost no eﬀect on the insurance premium and (ii)
the punishment is less costly since the benefit from risk-sharing remains important. However,
the cooperative equilibrium may not exist. As expected, existence is more likely the higher the
policyholders’ probability-adjusted discount factor 
Moreover, since the left and the right-hand side of (17) are equal for  = 1 (see the proof in
Appendix 10.4), existence only occurs if the left-hand side of the inequality increases faster in the
pool size than the right-hand side. In other words, cooperation can be obtained only if the benefit
from risk-sharing for low size pools is larger under cooperation than under either non-cooperation
or deviation.
In Figure 2 below we depict the left-hand side and the right-hand side of inequality (17) using
the utility function and the parameter values considered before together with a probability-adjusted
discount factor  = 03.18 Simulations show that, in this example, the cooperative equilibrium exists
for  ≤ 95019 For a larger pool size, the equilibrium is non-cooperative and all policyholders choose
the non-cooperative prevention level.
Insert Figure 2 about here
As basic comparative statics, we may take into account the eﬀects of changing two crucial
variables in the analysis of inequality (17): the risk aversion (relying on the parameter ) and the
probability of illness (), respectively. It is worth noting that an increase in the individuals’ risk
aversion from  = 05 to  = 06 leads to a large rise in the value of the pool size compatible with
18 In Figure 2, the graphs depicting the left and the right-hand side of (17) are not represented for the pool size
 = 1 because of the scale of the picture. At that point the two curves cross each other.
Also notice that, in the considered example, the combination of deviation and non-cooperation expressed in the
right-hand side of inequality (17) is monotonically increasing in the pool size.
19Existence of the cooperative equilibrium can also be obtained with utility functions diﬀerent from CARA.
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cooperation from 950 to 3100. This result relies on the fact that, when risk-aversion increases, the
benefit of risk-sharing among members in the pool is higher and utility from cooperation grows.
Conversely, after a decrease in risk aversion from  = 05 to  = 04, we observe that the maximum
pool size for which the cooperative equilibrium is sustainable is lower than 400.
Let’s now consider the illness probability . If it increases from  = 03 to  = 06, we observe
that cooperation is compatible with a smaller pool size: the upper bound value of the pool size
changes from 950 to 400. At first sight, this result may seem counterintuitive. In fact it relies on
the eﬀect the probability of accident has on the policyholders’ optimal prevention level. Indeed,
an increase in the probability of illness reduces the diﬀerence between the individuals’ optimal
prevention under cooperation and under non-cooperation (as it increases the benefit from exerting
prevention) and thus decreases the diﬀerences between expected utilities. Symmetrically, reducing
the probability from  = 03 to  = 02 increases the maximum size of the pool compatible with
cooperation from 950 to 1600.
To sum up, when policyholders interact for an indefinite number of periods, the cooperative
equilibrium can be achieved as long as  ≤ ˆ, whereas only the non-cooperative equilibrium is
sustainable if   ˆ. Figure 3 describes the whole equilibrium schedule as a function of the pool
size for the same numerical example we used above.
Insert Figure 3 about here
As a final remark, in our framework a deviation from the cooperative action can be inferred by
observing an insurance claim larger than expected, provided that the policyholder who is deviating
suﬀers the loss. As the literature on firms’ collusion shows, it is possible to obtain cooperation also
in settings where detection of cheating behaviors is even more uncertain than in our model (see
Green and Porter 198420). For this reason we guess that, also in our framework and under more
stringent conditions, cooperation would still be sustained if the loss function was non-deterministic.
8 Policy considerations
We mentioned in the introduction that firms oﬀering participating policies generally encourage
long-run enrollment, prevention measures and all services promoting a healthy life (Broek at al.,
2012).
We provide here some real examples of policy promoting long run enrollment. CAMPA, one of
the most important health mutuals in the North of Italy, only oﬀers three-year contracts, renewable
every three years without any limit due to age or health conditions. It does not impose any age
limit to subscription since individuals can enroll up to their 70th birthday and can still purchase
a policy when they are older than 70, provided that a younger member of the family subscribes
as well. Moreover, policyholders are explicitly encouraged to remain enrolled all life long. Finally,
one of the missions of the mutual, is to promote preventive measures, check-ups and diagnostic
screening: "We oﬀer insurance against the financial risk associated with buying medical care and
assure an appropriate and fast diagnostic screening and prevention".21
20They examine the nature of cartel self-enforcement in the presence of demand uncertainty. In particular, in their
setting, demand fluctuations not directly observed by firms make the detection of deviation diﬃcult to infer so that
collusive equilibria are less likely and an unstable industry performance can occur. In fact, reversionary episodes,
where price cut is performed by all firms in the cartel as a punishment strategy, can sometimes happen with no firm
really defecting, simply because of low demand.
21 See the home page of the website of CAMPA (consulted in January 2014): http://www.campa.it/index.php.
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In 2006 AGF, a French mutual company, made an agreement with Danone such that its policy-
holders received a large reimbursement for the consumption of healthy food like “Danacol”. AGF
explained that this action was fully in line with its long term objective concerning policyholders’
healthy behaviors and prevention (see Les Echos, 2006).
Diﬀerently from mutual firms, standard health insurers do not encourage long run enrollment.
Contracts are strictly annual and their renewal is conditional on the policyholder’s health conditions
and age.22 23
In a normative perspective, to compare the eﬃciency of participating and non-participating
policies we should take into account the best strategies that standard insurers could adopt if long
term contracts were oﬀered. In the concluding section, we provide some suggestions for a modeling
strategy aimed at the comparison of the two policies.
However, let’s take for a moment a positive perspective. Since standard health insurers do not
oﬀer long term contracts in the real world and do not generally use information on past behaviors
to incentivate prevention, our results suggest that existing participating policies may be more
eﬀective in encouraging prevention than non-participating ones. To see this, suppose a cooperative
equilibrium exists, as Figure 2 shows, for a size of the pool lower than 950. For the same functions
and parameter values used in the simulations of Section 7, we can evaluate expected utility derived
from the second-best contract which represents a non-participating policy (see Subsection 2.2).
Note that expected utility generated by a second-best policy with fixed premium is independent, by
construction, of the size of the pool; whereas expected utility generated by a participating policy
is increasing in the pool size, as Lemma 2 states. Simulations show that the participating policy
dominates the second-best contract for a pool size larger than 250 (see Figure 4).24 This implies
that, in this example, a large range of pool sizes exists such that cooperation is sustained as an
equilibrium and the participating policy is more eﬃcient than the second-best contract.
Insert Figure 4 about here
As a last remark, our results echo a recent debate on insurance regulation and mutual companies.
In 2009 an association of French mutual insurance companies (ROAM) started to protest against
the new measures that “Solvency 2” was going to introduce to increase the security of consumers; the
protest spread to the entire European insurance sector one year later (see http://www.stopsolvency2.com/).
The European Insurance and Reinsurance Federation (CEA) claimed that many players would not
be able to continue doing business and that a sharp fall in supply may occur. Indeed, because of
the administrative cost introduced by the new regulation, the latter would be threatening for small
or middle-sized organizations. As a result, in many cases, insurance prices would be pushed higher
without improving the security of consumers. In this respect, our results suggest that the survival of
small and middle-sized firms oﬀering participating policies is also important for eﬃciency reasons,
so that possible drawbacks of the new regulation could be greater than alleged.
22The Aﬀordable Care Act approved recently in the US has many objectives; one of them is to protect policyholders
from the insurers’ practice of refusing policy renewal in the case of serious health conditions.
23 Interestingly, long term contracts are instead oﬀered by stock insurers in other markets. For example front-loaded
contracts in life insurance generate a partial lock-in of consumers: contracts that are more front-loaded have a lower
present value of premiums over the period of coverage (see Hendel and Lizzeri 2003).
24These simulations are available upon request to the authors.
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9 Conclusion
Previous literature showed that a copayment on expenditures for preventive care is necessary to
encourage prevention choices since, with standard contracts, policyholders do not internalize the
positive impact of their action on the insurance premium.
In this paper we analyzed an alternative type of contract, the prevention choices it leads to and
its welfare properties. We showed that participating policies allow policyholders to make non-myopic
choices concerning preventive care. More specifically, members of risk-sharing arrangements may
find it convenient to choose a cooperative prevention strategy and fully cope with the appropriate
level of prevention. A necessary condition is that policyholders enroll for a suﬃcient amount of
time, so that cooperation becomes a worthy strategy. If the size of the pool is not too large,
the upper bound of cooperation results from the trade-oﬀ between mutualization and free-riding
issues. This is consistent with the general view that small pools allow for better monitoring of
policyholders’ behaviors and with the empirical evidence that firms oﬀering health participating
policies are typically small (see Caire 2009, Kerleau 2009 and Lippi Bruni et al. 2012).
The cooperative behavior we consider in the model does not require an individual to be em-
pathetic with other members within the pool, but originates from an absolutely standard utility
maximizer attitude. However, supportive, fair and conditional cooperative behaviors can be consid-
ered plausible in a mutual agreement, given the very specific nature of the participating contract. In
other words, willingness to cooperate may be higher for individuals who self-select in organizations
selling participating policies. For example, solidarity principles explicitly mentioned in all mutual
insurance articles of association/incorporation, if shared by the policyholders, could well provide
a better route to cooperation25. Moreover, cheating behaviors can also entail some psychological
costs to the deviator in terms of, for example, lower self-esteem or a social stigma. Obviously, some
kind of prosocial attitude or altruism may push towards cooperation as well (see Alger and Weibull,
2010, on the impact of altruism on risk-sharing).
Although remaining in a framework where individuals are characterized by purely selfish prefer-
ences, members of the mutual agreement partially know each other since they assemble for periodical
meetings. This suggests that some partial peer monitoring is possible, letting cooperative equilibria
easier to be sustained.
As a final consideration, cooperation has been analyzed under a punishment strategy that better
fits a non-competitive setting (we assumed that, if a deviation is detected, all policyholders turn to
their non-cooperative strategy). It might therefore be interesting to analyze to what extent our re-
sults can be generalized to other punishment strategies, compatible with a competitive environment.
However, such analysis depends largely on the kind of policies (participating vs. non-participating)
oﬀered by the competitors and on how the latter make use of historical data when oﬀering non-
participating policies (see for example Moreno et al., 2006 on bonus-malus schemes used in car
insurance). Interestingly, this framework would allow a comparison of the eﬃciency properties of
participating and non-participating policies when prevention matters and non-participating policies
promote policyholders long run enrollment too; this question is left to future research.
25The beneficial matching between agents characterized by a similar “mission” (or social attitude) has been ana-
lyzed by Besley and Ghatack (2005), where moral hazard can be solved more cheaply if employer and employee share
the same motivation.
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10 Appendix
10.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We solve the game in two stages. In the first stage, policyholders “cooperatively” choose the level of
coverage  and, in the second one, each individual chooses non-cooperatively his level of prevention
. Remember that:
 (  −) =
−1X
=0
(;− 1; ){ ¡ ¢+ (1− ) ¡0 ¢}− ()
where  =  −  (() + (−))− () + () and 0 =  −  (−).
In the second stage each policyholder maximizes his utility w.r.t.  The symmetric Nash
equilibrium, () thus solves
³
1−  + 
´ −1X
=0
(;− 1; ) 0
h
 −
³
1−  +  ( + 1)
´
()
i
+
 0()
0() = 0 (18)
while, in the first stage, the optimal coverage solves
max  () ≡ 
 ( () ())
since, according to the envelope theorem, 

 ( () ()) = 0 the optimal coverage 
is implicitly defined as:
 0() = 

 ( 
() ()) + 

− ( 
() ())

 () = 0 (19)
The following part of the proof is in two steps. In the first step we prove that the first term in the
previous equation is equal to zero in the case of full coverage. In the second step we prove that the
second term of the previous equation is negative in the case of full coverage. This implies that full
coverage is not the optimal coverage and that the optimal coverage is lower than 1.
Step 1. Let’s first prove that the first term in (19) is nill for  = 1
 ( () ()) = (())
P−1
=0 (;− 1; ){ 0
£ ¤ −(+1) − (1− ) 0 £0 ¤ }
= (())P−1=0 (;− 1; ) 0 £ ¤ −(+1)
− (1− )(())P−1=0 (;− 1; ) 0 £0 ¤ 
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where the first term equals 0 for  = − 1 and the second term equals 0 for  = 0 thus:
 ( () ()) = (())
P−2
=0 (;− 1; ) 0
£ ¤ −(+1)
− (1− )(())P−1=1 (;− 1; ) 0 £0 ¤ 
= (())P−2=0 (−1)!!(−1−)!(1− )−1− 0 £ ¤ −(+1)
− (1− )(())P−1=1 (−1)!!(−1−)!(1− )−1− 0 £0 ¤ 
= (
())

P−2
=0
(−1)!
!(−1−(+1))!+1(1− )−1− 0
£ ¤
− (
())

P−1
=1
(−1)!
(−1)!(−1−)!(1− )− 0
£0 ¤
= (
())

P−2
=0
(−1)!
!(−1−(+1))!+1(1− )−1− 0
h
 −
³ (+1)
 + 1− 
´i
− (
())

P−1
=1
(−1)!
(−1)!(−1−)!(1− )− 0
h
 − 
i
A change of index with respect to the binomial probability on the left side gives:
 ( () ()) = (
())

P−1
=1
(−1)!
(−1)!(−1−))!(1− )− 0
h
 −
³ 
 + 1− 
´
)
i
− (
())

P−1
=1
(−1)!
(−1)!(−1−)!(1− )− 0
h
 − 
i
= (
())

P−1
=1
(−1)!
(−1)!(−1−)!(1− )−
n
 0
h
 −
³ 
 + 1− 
´i
−  0
h
 − 
io
Therefore when  = 1 the first term of (19) is  (1 (1) (1)) = 0 such that for  = 1
(19) can be rewritten as:
 0(1) = 

− (1 
(1) (1))

 (1)
Step 2. Now we prove that  0(1)  0 which implies that  = 1 is not the optimal coverage.
First,

− ( 
() ()) = − 
0())
−1X
=0
(;− 1; ) £ 0 ¡ ¢+ (1− ) 0 ¡0 ¢¤
and is positive for all levels of .
For  = 1 and given that  is the total number of losses in the pool of insurees, the previous
expression equals:

− (1 
(1) (1)) = − 1
0(1))
X
=0
(;; )( − 1) 0
µ
 −  (
(1))
¶
 0
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Now, writing (18) as ( ) = 0, and fully diﬀerentiating with respect to  and  we have  =
−() ()  In particular, we have:

 ( ) =
−1X
=0
(;− 1; )
∙³
1−  + 
´µ
1−  + 1
¶
() 00( )− − 1 
0( )
¸
 0
and

 ( ) = −
¡
1−  + 
¢P−1
=0 (;−1; )
¡
1−  + ( + 1)
¢000 ¡ ¢+00 ()0()−000 ()[02  0
Therefore, for all levels of coverage   0. In particular, for  = 1 we have:

 (1) =
−1
=0 (;−1;)

1
(1−
+1
 )()
00
(−+1 ((1)))−−1  0(−+1 ((1)))

1

P−1
=0 (;− 1; ) 1( + 1)0
00 ¡ − +1 ((1))¢− 00 ()0()−000 ()[02  0
10.2 Proof of Corollary 1
Under cooperation and in the first stage, the optimal coverage solves
max  () ≡ 
( () ())
applying the envelope theorem:
 0() = 

 ( 
() ()) = 0 (20)
Since  ( () ()) = 

 ( () ()) we can now refer to Step 1 in the proof
of Lemma 1 to state that (20) is verified for  = 1
10.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Let’s first define ˜ as the stochastic wealth of individual  given that  agents among the  − 1
others fall ill. Full coverage implies that, under cooperation ˜ = − ˜ where  = +1  () with
probability  and  () with probability (1− ).(∗  ∗  ) is then increasing in  if (∗  ∗  +1) is less risky than (∗  ∗  ),
that is if adding a new member to the pool decreases the aggregate risk. This can be written asP
=1 ˜ less risky than
P−1
=1 ˜−1 or
X
=1
˜
 + ˜ =
−1X
=1
˜
− 1 (21)
with  £˜ ¯¯P=1 ˜ ¤ = 0 Equation (21) can be rewritten as:
˜ = 
P−1
=1 ˜ − (− 1)
P
=1 ˜
 (− 1) =
P
=1 ˜ − ˜
 (− 1)
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Therefore,

"
˜
¯¯¯¯
¯
X
=1
˜

#
= 0 if and only if
P
=1 ˜
 (− 1) =
1
− 1
"
˜
¯¯¯¯
¯
X
=1
˜

#
that is if and only if:

"
˜
¯¯¯¯
¯
X
=1
˜

#
=
P
=1 ˜

Now, as the ˜ are i.i.d., we have:

"
˜
¯¯¯¯
¯
X
=1
˜

#
= 
"
˜
¯¯¯¯
¯
X
=1
˜

#
∀
and

"
˜
¯¯¯¯
¯
X
=1
˜

#
=
P
=1
£˜ ¯¯P=1 ˜ ¤
 = 
"P
=1 ˜

¯¯¯¯
¯
X
=1
˜

#
=
P
=1 ˜

10.4 Proof of Proposition 1
We show that the left-hand side of (17) is equal to its right-hand side for  = 1; whereas the left-hand
side is lower than the right-hand side for  =∞ Remember that, from Lemma 2, (∗  ∗  1)
is monotonically increasing in . Thus, a cooperative equilibrium exists if the left-hand side of (17)
crosses its right-hand side from above, implying that the size of the pool must be suﬃciently low.
• For  = 1 the sole policyholder will always choose the optimal prevention level. Thus,
(∗  ∗  1) = (∗  ∗  1) = (  ∗  1) and condition (17) holds with
equality.
• When  → ∞ the impact of one policyholder’s prevention on the premium is negligible so
that deviation is always profitable. This can be seen by rewriting inequality (17) with →∞
1
1− 
£( −  ¡∗¢)−  ¡∗¢¤ ≥ (22)
1
1−  (1− )
∙
( −  ¡∗¢) + 
1− (
∗  ∗ ∞)
¸
where
(∗  ∗ ∞) =  £ − (1−  + )(∗)¤+(1− ) £ − (∗)¤−(∗)
Rearranging we can write:
 ¡∗¢ ≤  "(∗  ∗ ∞)− ( −  ¡∗¢)
1−  (1− )
#
Since 11−(1−)  1 and (∗  ∗ ∞)  ( − 
¡∗¢) the right-hand side of the
previous inequality is negative so that the latter is never satisfied. Thus, deviation is always
profitable for →∞ and (17) does not hold.
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